Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 48

Number 4

Article 4

2015

Belk v. Commissioner: Land Substitutions in Conservation
Easements
Morgan Davis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Tax Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Morgan Davis, Belk v. Commissioner: Land Substitutions in Conservation Easements, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1193 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol48/iss4/4

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

BELK V. COMMISSIONER: LAND
SUBSTITUTIONS IN CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS
Morgan Davis∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code permits landowners to take an
income tax deduction for donating a “conservation easement.”1 A
conservation easement restricts land development in favor of one or
more conservation goals.2 These goals may include the preservation
of land for public outdoor recreation or education, the protection of a
natural habitat of wildlife or plants, the preservation of open space
for scenic enjoyment, or the preservation of a historically important
area.3
For example, suppose a landowner owns property abutting a
river that is the natural habitat for a population of fish. The
landowner may donate a conservation easement extinguishing her
right to develop the land in order to protect the natural habitat. This
donation constitutes a charitable contribution and entitles the
landowner to take an income tax deduction.4 Conservation easements
that qualify for an income tax deduction are referred to as “qualified
conservation contributions” and are deductible under section 170(h)
of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).5
B.V. Belk Jr. and Harriet C. Belk (“Petitioners”) sought to take
advantage of the conservation easement deduction. Petitioners
∗ J.D., LL.M., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, May 2015; B.A., Philosophy, University
of California, Irvine, May 2011. Thank you to Professor Katherine Pratt for her expert guidance
and unwavering support as I wrote this Comment.
1. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2012); Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax
Expenditure: In Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (2012).
2. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
VA. L. REV. 739, 741–42 (2002).
3. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A); Connie Kertz, Conservation Easements at the Crossroads,
34 REAL EST. L.J. 139, 143 (2005).
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h).
5. Id. § 170. Title 26 of United States Code is referred to as the Internal Revenue Code.
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donated a conservation easement and claimed a deduction of more
than $10.5 million in 2004.6 The easement protected a golf course
nestled within a private residential complex.7 Petitioners’ easement
included a “substitution provision” whereby the parties could agree
to change what land was subject to the easement’s development
restrictions.8 In Belk v. Commissioner (Belk I),9 the tax court denied
Petitioners’ charitable contribution deduction, holding that
Petitioners’ easement was not a restriction “granted in perpetuity” as
required by the Code.10
Since Congress first allowed conservation easement deductions
in 1976,11 donations of conservation easements have rapidly
increased.12 Now, an estimated forty million acres in the United
States are encumbered by conservation easements.13 Furthermore,
donations of conservation easements typically generate six-figure
deductions.14 Conservation easement deductions cost taxpayers
billions of dollars in the form of foregone tax revenue.15 One
estimate provides that $3.6 billion total revenue was lost between
2003 and 2008, not including corporate donations of conservation
easements.16
The court in Belk I held that any conservation easement
containing a substitution provision was not eligible for a charitable
contribution deduction.17 The court’s decision discourages taxpayers
from including substitution provisions in their conservation
easements because such easements will not receive favorable tax

6. Belk v. Comm’r (Belk I), 140 T.C. 1, 6 (2013). Precisely, Petitioners claimed a deduction
in the amount of $10,524,000. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 3–4.
9. 140 T.C. 1 (2013).
10. Id. at 10, 15.
11. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e)(1)(C), 90 Stat. 1916, 1919
(1967) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
12. Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma
of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 119, 119 (2010).
13. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What
Have We Learned and Where Should We Go From Here?, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 687, 717 (2013).
14. Id. at 715–16.
15. Id. at 716.
16. Colinvaux, supra note 1, at 9–10 n.26.
17. Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 10–11 (2013); see Belk v. Comm’r (Belk II), 105 T.C.M. (CCH)
1878, *6–7 (2013).
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treatment. This outcome is undesirable because substitution
provisions can help easements achieve their conservation goals.18
Part II of this Comment presents the facts of Belk I, and Part III
explains the court’s reasoning. Part IV.B analyzes the court’s
reasoning in Belk I and explains that Petitioners granted an easement
in perpetuity. Part IV.C analyzes Belk I’s subsequent history, Belk v.
Commissioner T.C.M. (Belk II),19 and concludes that the court was
primarily concerned with how Petitioners valued their easement. Part
IV.D argues for the desirability of substitution provisions, explaining
that such provisions can help achieve an easement’s conservation
purposes. Part V proposes a rule for handling future substitution
provisions. Finally, Part VI presents the issue of whether easements
protecting golf courses, like Petitioners’ easement, should be
categorically ineligible for the deduction under section 170.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Belk I, Petitioners owned approximately 410 acres of land,
which they transferred to their limited liability company Olde
Sycamore, LLC (“Olde Sycamore”).20 Olde Sycamore built a
residential community on the land, which included a semi-public golf
course.21 The golf course was not contiguous, but lay in clusters
throughout the residential development.22 In total, the golf course
consisted of roughly 185 acres.23
Olde Sycamore granted a conservation easement to Smokey
Mountain National Land Trust (SMNLT) that prohibited the
185-acre golf course from being used for residential, commercial,
institutional, industrial, or agricultural purposes.24 The agreement
stated, and the parties later stipulated, that the golf course possessed
recreational, natural, scenic, open space, and educational values.25
The agreement contained a “substitution provision,” whereby
Petitioners and SMNLT could mutually agree to change what
18. See Bray, supra note 12, at 138 (discussing the desirability of “shifting” easements).
19. 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878 (2013).
20. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 2.
21. Id. at 2–3.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id. Precisely, the golf course covered 184.627 acres, id., but for the sake of simplicity, I
will refer to the specific acres on which the golf course sits as 185 acres.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3 n.7.
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property was subject to the conservation easement and its
accompanying restrictions.26 The substitution provision, which
allowed Petitioners to substitute an area of contiguous land for land
currently restricted by the easement, provided in relevant part that (1)
the substituted land was of equal or greater area than the land to be
taken out; (2) the substitution would not adversely affect the
conservation purpose of the easement or any other significant
environmental features of the easement; and (3) the fair market value
of SMNLT’s conservation easement would not decline as a result of
the substitution.27 The substitution provision further provided that if
SMNLT did not consent to a proposed substitution, SMNLT would
help Petitioners identify land that would meet all of the substitution
provision’s requirements “but also accomplish [Petitioners’]
objectives.”28
Petitioners claimed a charitable contribution deduction of
$10,524,000 for donating the conservation easement.29 They
calculated the amount of the deduction by taking the difference
between the fair market value of the 185 acres unrestricted and the
fair market value of the 185 acres restricted by the easement.30 The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Petitioners’
deduction, and they contested the Commissioner’s finding in court.31
The tax court held that Petitioners were not entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction because their “floating easement”32 was not a
“qualified conservation contribution.”33
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The tax court began by explaining that section 170 of the Code
governs charitable contribution deductions.34 Section 170(f) prohibits

26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 3–4. The substitution provision additionally provided that in the opinion of
SMNLT, (1) the substituted land was of the same or better ecological stability as the land to be
taken out; (2) the substitution would have no adverse impact on the environmental features of the
conservation area, nor adversely impact it in any way; and (3) petitioners had to submit sufficient
documentation to SMNLT showing how the substitution met the required criteria. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5–6.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 10–11, 15.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012); Belk I, 140 T.C. at 6.
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charitable contribution deductions for transfers of partial interests in
property, such as an easement, but provides an exception for
“qualified conservation contributions.”35 A qualified conservation
contribution is a (1) qualified real property interest; (2) transferred to
a qualified organization; (3) exclusively for conservation purposes.36
A qualified real property interest includes “a restriction (granted in
perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.”37
Additionally, for a contribution to be made “exclusively for
conservation purposes,” the conservation purpose must be protected
in perpetuity.38
The court held that Petitioners’ donated easement was not a
restriction granted in perpetuity, and thus, Petitioners did not make a
qualified conservation contribution entitling them to a deduction.39
The court found that Petitioners donated an interest in their golf
course.40 The restriction on the golf course was not granted in
perpetuity, however, because Petitioners could change what land was
subject to the easement.41 In essence, the court found that Petitioners
had agreed not to develop the golf course, but simultaneously had
retained the right to develop the golf course through the substitution
provision.42 Thus, Petitioners did not donate an interest in real
property that was subject to a restriction in perpetuity.43
The court rejected Petitioners’ argument that because the
conservation purpose was protected in perpetuity, the restriction was
granted in perpetuity also.44 The court distinguished between the
requirements that (1) the use restriction be granted in perpetuity, and
(2) the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity.45 The court
held that the restriction was not granted in perpetuity.46
Consequently, the court did not address whether the conservation

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Belk I, 140 T.C. at 6–7 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(f), (h)).
26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1); Belk I, 140 T.C. at 7.
26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C); Belk I, 140 T.C. at 9.
26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(A).
Belk I, 140 T.C. at 15.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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purpose was protected in perpetuity.47 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied in Belk II.48
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Historical Significance
The distinction the court in Belk I made between the
requirement that the restriction be granted in perpetuity (the
“restriction-in-perpetuity requirement”) and the requirement that
the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity (the
“conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement”) marks a departure
from previous interpretations of section 170(h).49 In Belk I, the
Commissioner combined discussion of both requirements.50 In
previous decisions the court itself combined its discussion of both
requirements, suggesting that they were equivalent.51
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Treasury has merged the
two requirements.52 The U.S. Department of Treasury publishes
federal income tax regulations, which represent the “official” (i.e.,
executive) interpretations of the Code.53 The Treasury Regulation
interpreting section 170(h), Reg. § 1.170A-14, discusses “the
perpetuity requirement” in subsection (g) without mentioning
whether it refers to the restriction or the conservation purpose.54 In
fact, subsection (g) mentions both the restriction-in-perpetuity and
the conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirements. Subsection (g)(1)
discusses the perpetuity requirement “in general” and mentions the

47. Id. at 15.
48. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878 (2013).
49. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 11–12 (citing Simmons v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211 (2009);
Turner v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 299, 311 (2006); Glass v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 258, 276–77 (2005)).
50. Belk I, 140 T.C. at 11.
51. Id. at 11–12 (citing Simmons, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at 211; Turner, 126 T.C. at 311; Glass,
124 T.C. at 276–77).
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (as amended in 2009).
53. See Tax Code, Regulations and Official Guidance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Tax
-Professionals/Tax-Code,-Regulations-and-Official-Guidance (last updated Feb. 24, 2014).
Section 7805 of the Code gives the IRS the authority to interpret its provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 7805
(2012). Courts give deference to the regulations, but they are not law. See generally Ellen P.
Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996)
(discussing the appropriate degree of deference courts should give to the regulations).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g).
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conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement.55 However, subsection
(g)(3) discusses the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement.56 In
holding that the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement and the
conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement are distinct, the court
explained that Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(g) pertains only to
the conservation-purpose-perpetuity requirement.57 Yet even after
Belk I, tax courts have continued to use the regulation in their
analysis of the restriction-in-perpetuity-requirement.58 If the court’s
distinction continues to hold, the regulations should be amended to
clearly set out which rules apply to which requirement.
Belk I renders all conservation easements that allow for
substitutions ineligible for a deduction because they are not
restrictions granted in perpetuity and, therefore, are not a “qualified
real property interest.”59 The discussion that follows analyzes the
soundness of the court’s arguments in Belk I and Belk II and the
desirability of their holdings.
B. Belk I
The court in Belk I did not address whether Petitioners
transferred a property interest “exclusively for conservation
purposes.”60 For the sake of argument, this Comment assumes that
Petitioners did, and that the “conservation purpose” was to preserve

55. See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (“[A]ny interest in the property retained by the donor . . . must
be subject to legally enforceable restrictions . . . that will prevent uses of the retained interest
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation.”).
56. See id. (explaining that an easement does not fail to be a qualified conservation
contribution merely because the donee’s interest would fail on the happening of some remote
event); see also Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377, 392–93 (2013) (using Treasury Regulation
subsection (g)(3) to explain the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement (26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C))).
57. Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 12 n.19 (2013) (explaining that Treasury Regulation section 1.170A14(g) relates to code section 170(h)(5), which is the conservation-purpose-perpetuity
requirement).
58. See, e.g., Graev, 140 T.C. at 393 (decided after Belk I and discussing Treasury
Regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(3) while analyzing the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement (26
U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C))); Gorra v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, *20 (2013) (also decided
after Belk I and clarifying the restriction-in-perpetuity requirement with reference to Treasury
Regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(1)).
59. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *2, *6–7 (2013).
60. See Belk I, 140 T.C. at 15 (concluding that Petitioners have not satisfied section
170(h)(2)(C), relating to a qualified real property interest, and therefore Petitioners are not
entitled to a deduction).
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the “recreational, open-space and scenic value” of the golf course, as
stipulated by the parties.61
Petitioners arguably transferred a restriction on real property in
perpetuity. Neither party could extinguish the restriction.62 The
parties could merely agree to change which specific acreage was
subject to the easement’s restrictions.63
The court in Belk I began with the assumption that Petitioners
transferred an interest in “the golf course.”64 In fact, Petitioners
transferred a more abstract property interest. They transferred an
interest in 410 acres of land, whereby at least 185 acres could not be
used for residential, commercial, institutional, industrial, or
agricultural purposes, and further satisfied the requirements of the
substitution provision.65 Petitioners did not promise to refrain from
developing the golf course, as the court claimed.66 Rather, Petitioners
promised to maintain at least 185 acres of land undeveloped, and
promised to preserve recreational, open-space, and scenic value at
least to the extent the golf course possessed these values.67 This
promise is not illusory: it limits how much Petitioners can develop
their land in favor of the conservation value of the golf course.
Construed in this way, the restriction exists in perpetuity. At any
given moment, the restriction is in effect, but what specific acreage is
giving it effect is subject to change. Thus, the court in Belk I should
have held that Petitioners granted a restriction in perpetuity.
C. Belk II
On Petitioners’ request for reconsideration, the court in Belk II
maintained that a qualified real property interest must be a specific
and identifiable piece of real property.68 The court went on to explain
its reasons for denying the deduction and, in so doing, revealed that
its discomfort with Petitioners’ easement was not with the

61. Id. at 3 n.7.
62. See id. at 3–4.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 2–3. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue characterized Petitioners’ easement as
a “floating easement,” which is a helpful label for easements that allow for substitutions. Id. at 10.
66. Id. at 10–11.
67. See id. at 3–5.
68. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *7–8 (2013).
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restriction’s lack of perpetuity but with how Petitioners valued their
easement. The Court thus explained:
When a taxpayer donates a partial interest, he retains the
remaining interest in the property. Thus, the taxpayer is
effectively splitting the property into two pieces: (1) the
retained portion and (2) the donated portion. Petitioners’
interpretation of the statute would allow the donated portion
(i.e., the easement) to encumber any piece of property; it
could be the retained portion or another piece of property
that the taxpayer owns . . . If the donated portion does not
restrict the use of the retained portion, then the taxpayer has
retained 100% of the economic value of the property for
which he or she is taking a deduction. The fact that the
donated property might encumber and thus reduce the value
of some unrelated property is irrelevant.69
Here, the court still assumed that Petitioners had retained an
interest in “the golf course.”70 In fact, Petitioners had retained an
interest in the full 410 acres of land. The “donated portion” of the
410 acres was the requirement that at least 185 acres of the 410
remain undeveloped and possess the current golf course’s
conservation value. Petitioners did not retain 100 percent of the
economic value of the 410 acres because they could not develop all
410 acres: at least 185 acres had to remain undeveloped and
effectuate the conservation purposes of the easement.
Yet, Petitioners calculated their deduction as the difference in
value between the golf course unrestricted and the golf course
subject to the easement’s restrictions.71 In other words, Petitioners’
value of the easement assumed that the easement would always
restrict the golf course.72 Petitioners’ valuation does not include the
fact that they can restrict other portions of the 410 acres in place of
the golf course.73 As the court in Belk II explained above, Petitioners
cannot take a deduction based on the value of the golf course and, at
the same time, develop the golf course by restricting other land.74

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
Id. at *2–3.
Belk I, 140 T.C. at 5.
See id. at 10 n.15.
Id.
See Belk II, 105 T.C.M (CCH) 1878, *7–8 (2013).
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The land that could be substituted must be factored into the
easement’s value.
The Treasury Regulations provide that the amount of a
charitable deduction for a conservation easement is the fair market
value of the easement.75 Often, taxpayers are permitted to calculate
the value of their easements by taking the difference between the fair
market value of the property involved before and after the grant of
the easement.76 When an easement burdens only a portion of a
landowner’s contiguous property, the fair market value of the
easement is the value of all of the landowner’s contiguous property
before and after granting the easement.77 Thus, Petitioners should
have valued their easement based on the difference between the fair
market value of their 410 acres pre- and post-easement. Specifically,
they should have taken the difference between the value of the 410
acres unencumbered, and the value of the 410 acres where 185 of the
acres must be used as a golf course, or otherwise possess the current
golf course’s conservation values.
Valuation is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry,78 and possibly,
Petitioners could have ascertained additional factors relevant to the
easement’s value. However, merely taking the golf course’s value
before the easement and subtracting the value of the golf course
subject to the easement’s restrictions was not an accurate estimate of
the easement’s value.79 Therefore, the court in Belk I or Belk II could
have denied Petitioners’ deduction on valuation grounds.
D. An Outright Ban on Substitution
Provisions Is Undesirable
As mentioned above, Belk I and Belk II render easements with
substitution provisions ineligible for the federal income tax
deduction in all cases.80 But substitution provisions are desirable
because they create flexibility in conservation easement

75. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009).
76. Id.; Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
77. Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. v. Comm’r, 615 F.3d 321, 338 (5th Cir. 2010); Browning v.
Comm’r, 109 T.C. 303, 316 (1997); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). Additionally, if an
easement increases the value of any of the landowner’s other property, whether or not contiguous,
this increase proportionately decreases the easement’s value. Kertz, supra note 3, at 145.
78. See, e.g., Stanley Works and Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 389, 408 (1986).
79. See Kertz, supra note 3, at 145.
80. Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *7–8 (2013).
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restrictions.81 Experts in conservation easements have recently
argued for increased flexibility in easement restrictions.82 Because
“[o]ur sense of what is ecologically and scenically valuable . . .
evolve[s] over time,”83 inflexible restrictions in conservation
easements may obstruct future conservation efforts.84 Some scholars
are already exploring the desirability of so-called “shifting”
conservation easements.85 These easements would protect against
species loss by tracking “migrating species . . . across different land
parcels.”86 In order for conservation easements to track migrating
species, or account for habitats shifting due to climate change, they
need something akin to a substitution provision contained in their
terms.87
As another example, consider the following hypothetical:
suppose a certain taxpayer owns five hundred acres of land. She
intends to develop the land but has discovered that a population of
endangered species lives somewhere on the premises. So the
taxpayer agrees to set aside two hundred acres for habitat
preservation. If the precise location of the species is unknown, the
taxpayer should be allowed to donate a conservation easement
containing a substitution provision so that the parties can later
substitute the land that best protects the habitat. Or, suppose after the
taxpayer granted the easement, the easement holder determined that a
different two hundred acres would better preserve the habitat. In such
a case, the parties should be free to substitute the land that better
serves the easement’s conservation purposes, pursuant to a
substitution provision, and the taxpayer should be entitled to the tax
deduction.

81. See Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of
Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 122 (2011).
82. See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process
(Case Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-24, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1004363.
83. Id. at 31.
84. Bray, supra note 12, at 138; see Duncan M. Greene, Dynamic Conservation Easements:
Facing the Problem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883, 885 (2005)
(“[D]ynamic conservation easements capable of accommodating change over time . . . are more
likely to fulfill their promise to protect the land in perpetuity.”).
85. Bray, supra note 12, at 138.
86. Id.
87. See id.
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Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-1488 provides that an easement
may be terminated if “changed conditions . . . make impossible or
impractical the continued use of the property for conservation
purposes.”89 In such a case, the easement holder must use its share of
the proceeds from a subsequent sale of the property consistently with
the easement’s conservation purposes.90 However, this limited
“substitution provision”91 only accounts for situations where
fulfilling the conservation purpose is impossible or impractical.92 It
does not account for situations where substituting another parcel of
land would simply better serve the easement’s conservation
purposes.
V. PROPOSAL
The facts in Belk I can be distinguished from the example given
above. In the example above, the parties’ reason for substituting
land, and thus the purpose of including a substitution provision in the
easement, is to better serve the easement’s conservation purpose. In
Belk I, the Petitioners included the substitution provision for their
own private benefit.93 Hypothetically, Petitioners could substitute
land to increase their income from the surrounding residential units.
The substitution provision allowed Petitioners to substitute land for
any reason, provided that the conservation purpose was protected
along with other requirements.94 If SMNLT did not consent to a
proposed substitution, SMNLT had to help Petitioners identify land
that would meet the substitution provision requirements “but also
accomplish [Petitioners’] objectives.”95 Therefore, the purpose of the
substitution provision was to benefit Petitioners personally, and not
to enhance the conservation value of the easement. After all, the golf
course could be built and maintained on any of the 410 acres, so
shifting the golf course to another location would not likely have

88. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (as amended in 2009).
89. Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i).
90. Id.
91. See Belk II, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1878, *9–10 (2013) (explaining that Treasury Regulation
section 1.170A-14 allows for “substitutions” where complying with easement’s restrictions
becomes impossible or impractical).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2).
93. See Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 3–4 (2013).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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made the golf course any better, bigger, more beautiful, or more open
to public. Rather, a substitution would have resulted in Petitioners’
private benefit by increasing the value of their residential
development.
Where a charitable contribution under section 170 results in a
private benefit to the donor, the amount of the charitable deduction
must be reduced by the amount of the benefit.96 That is, a
contribution is not “charitable” to the extent that it benefits the
donor.97 If, due to a substitution Petitioners’ 410 acres increased in
value, Petitioners would have to subtract this increase from the
amount of their charitable deduction.98 But in this case, Petitioners
would have already taken the deduction, and the statute of limitations
could run before a substitution ultimately took place, preventing the
IRS from contesting the deduction.99 The purpose of Petitioners’
substitution provision, and the likely effect of an actual substitution,
would be to privately benefit Petitioners, without a corresponding
public benefit or decrease in Petitioners’ deduction. Thus, Petitioners
should not be entitled to a charitable contribution deduction for their
easement.
A conservation easement with a substitution provision should be
deductible when the purpose of the provision is to further the
easement’s conservation purposes. Where the purpose of the
substitution provision is to benefit the private landowner, the
conservation easement should be ineligible for the deduction. This
proposed rule satisfactorily addresses both the facts in Belk I and the
hypothetical given in Part IV.D. As explained above, substitution
provisions can be useful tools in drafting conservation easements to
effectively serve their conservation purposes. But an easement
containing a substitution provision designed to benefit the landowner
is not a “charitable” contribution as required by section 170, because
the donor can privately benefit from a substitution without increasing
96. See Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
97. See United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986); Scheidelman v.
Comm’r, 682 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2012); Winters v. Comm’r, 468 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir.
1972).
98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i) (as amended in 2009) (“[I]f the donor . . . receives,
or can reasonably expect to receive, a financial or economic benefit that is substantial, but it is
clearly shown that the benefit is less than the amount of the transfer, then a deduction under this
section is allowable for the excess of the amount transferred over the amount of the financial or
economic benefit received or reasonably expected to be received by the donor . . . .”).
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) (2012).
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the public value of the contribution.100 One of the leading scholars in
conservation easements has expressed the need for “[r]easonable
rules regarding the amendment of perpetual conservation
easements—rules that ensure sufficient flexibility to . . . adapt to
changing circumstances.”101 Permitting substitutions only when they
further the conservation purposes of the easement and not when they
bestow private benefit should be one of these rules.
VI. DOES A GOLF COURSE HAVE A
“CONSERVATION” PURPOSE?
Another issue lurking within Belk I, and perhaps indirectly
influencing the court’s decision, is whether a golf course possesses a
sufficient conservation purpose. Many golf courses “literally comply
with [section] 170(h),”102 since they provide outdoor recreation for
the public.103 However, many conservation groups and legislators
have argued that golf courses should not be within the “conservation
purposes” allowed by the Code.104
For instance, in the wake of alleged abuses of section 170(h), the
Joint Committee on Finance held a hearing in 2005 suggesting
proposals to reform section 170(h).105 Many of the speakers
suggested that easements covering golf courses should not be eligible
for the deduction because golf courses are not natural and do not
yield a significant public benefit.106
In March 2014, the Obama administration proposed eliminating
the deduction for golf courses.107 The administration argued that the
private benefit gained from easements on golf courses often
outweighs the public benefit.108 Further, construction of golf courses
can actually lead to environmental degradation. As the facts in Belk I

100. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
101. McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 720.
102. Kertz, supra note 3, at 150.
103. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i).
104. Kertz, supra note 3, at 150.
105. The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report on Investigations and Proposals for
Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 4 (2005).
106. See, e.g., id. at 3, 6–7 (statement of Rand Wentworth, President, Land Trust Alliance);
id. at 9 (statement of Steven T. Miller, Internal Revenue Serv. Comm’r, Tax-Exempt Entities).
107. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 195 (2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource
-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf.
108. See id.
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illustrate, section 170(h) is not “narrowly tailored to promote only
bona fide conservation activities.”109 An easement covering a golf
course surrounded by a residential development is hardly a
“conservation activity.”110 And the easement is probably going to
benefit the developer more often than the public.111
Belk I was not the best test case for substitution provisions. The
easement covered a golf course, the golf course was surrounded by
development, and Petitioners took a deduction of more than ten
million dollars.112 These facts likely influenced the court’s decision
to deny the deduction outright as opposed to denying it on valuation
grounds. The court overstated the “restriction-in-perpetuity
requirement,” in an attempt to deny a deduction for a conservation
easement possessing little public benefit and considerable private
benefit. Nevertheless, the court’s flat ban on substitution provisions
is not desirable. If Congress agrees that easements on golf courses do
not provide a sufficient public benefit, Congress should amend
section 170(h).113
VII. CONCLUSION
Petitioners’ easement should not have failed for lack of
perpetuity. The easement’s restrictions were perpetual to the extent
that they were always in effect and could not be terminated by the
parties.114 However, Petitioners did not accurately value their
easement. Petitioners should have considered the value of the 410
acres before and after granting the easement.
In some situations, easements with substitution provisions
should be eligible for the deduction under section 170(h).
Specifically, when the purpose of the substitution provision is to
further the easement’s conservation purpose, the easement should be
eligible for the deduction. When the purpose of the substitution
provision is to bestow private benefit on the landowner, the provision

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Belk I, 140 T.C. 1, 2–3, 5 (2013).
113. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 713–14 (arguing that litigation is not the best way to
establish clear rules consistent with congressional intent and that section 170(h) or the regulations
should be revised).
114. See Belk I, 140 T.C. at 3–4.
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should render the easement ineligible as not constituting a
“charitable” contribution under section 170.
Golf courses arguably do not possess bona fide conservation
value. Easements preserving golf courses, especially those
surrounded by residential development, probably result in a larger
private benefit than public benefit. Despite the particular facts in
Belk I, substitution provisions should be encouraged when they
further the easement’s conservation purposes. Thus, a substitution
provision should not in itself render an easement ineligible for a
deduction under section 170.

